QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS:
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I. FORWARD
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984' (REA) amended the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 and
the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 by creating a limited exception to the prohibition of assignment or alienation of qualified
plan benefits when a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)
is issued pursuant to state domestic relations law.4 Not only are
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1 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. IV 1986), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) and Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100647, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 3342. For purposes of this
analysis of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, the Senate Finance Committee Report is controlling inasmuch as the Senate Bill was adopted without conference
with the House of Representatives. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2547.

2 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 864 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 1001
(Supp. IV 1986), amended by Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(Supp. IV 1986) and Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) and Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 3342.

3 Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 3, redesignated Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The rules prohibiting
assignment and alienation continue to apply to any domestic relations order that is
not a QDRO. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These restrictions
against assignment and alienation do not, however, apply to welfare benefits plans
such as health, legal, education and training benefits. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Serv., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988) (permitting garnishment proceedings against welfare benefits). Nor do they apply against fraudulent or criminal
conduct. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d
1457 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding constructive trust on embezzler's pension benefits
valid until judgment debt satisfied); Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815
F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (offsetting trustee-participant's interest in pension fund
against embezzlement of trust funds), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 328, reh 'g denied, 108 S.
Ct. 735 (1988); Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Cox, 752 F.2d 550 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(garnishing trustee-participant's pension to satisfy judgment debt resulting from
embezzlement of funds); contra, United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 811
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these QDRO's exempt from the preemptive and spendthrift provisions of ERISA, but they are also subject to certain exceptions,
so that the division of plan benefits incident to divorce may be
facilitated. 5
These materials analyze the changes effectuated by this
landmark legislation, including amendments implemented by the
Tax Reform Act of 19866 and the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988.1 Forms incorporating the statutory criteria
have been previously published.8
II.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Before the REA, Internal Revenue Code section 401(a) (13)
disqualified pension or profit sharing plans if plan benefits could
be assigned or alienated.9 State judicial authority thereafter split
with regard to the efficacy of local courts to attach plan benefits
in satisfaction of family support obligations.' 0 The Internal RevF.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1494 (1988); Ellis Nat'l Bank v.
Irving Trust, 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986). Federal and state courts have also been
sympathetic to the plight of creditors by allowing attachment of pension assets
where bankrupt participants are controlling shareholders, partners or sole proprietors. See, e.g., In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (attaching owner-employee's
interest in self-sponsored Keogh plan); Aronsohn & Springstead v. Weissman, 230
NJ. Super. 63, 552 A.2d 649 (App. Div. 1989). The Internal Revenue Service has
warned that distribution of plan benefits to a bankruptcy trustee will result in a
prohibited assignment under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and disqualification of the plan.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-29-009 (Apr. 6, 1988).
5 See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2549. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and ERISA are not
coextensive. See Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9343(a), 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 372 (rejecting the rationale of the court in
Calfee v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 641 (1987) which applied ERISA standards to
interpret the 1954 Internal Revenue Code). Section 9343(a) of the Act provides in
pertinent part that "[e]xcept to the extent specifically provided in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, titles I and
IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 are not applicable in
interpreting such Code." Id.
6 26 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1986).
7 Pub. L. No. 100-647, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.)
3342.
8 See, e.g., W. MULLOY & B. BROWN, WEST'S LEGAL FORMS 7 (Domestic Relations
With Tax Analysis) (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1987).
9 I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1982) (had permitted a limited 10% safe harbor for voluntary and revocable assignments by participants in pay status) (amended 1984).
10 See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Murray, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979) (no
preemption by ERISA if benefits vested); Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 413
A.2d 638 (Ch. Div. 1980) (no ERISA preemption for nonvested benefits). Compare
Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980) (ERISA not intended to preempt community property laws) with Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (ERISA preempts community property laws).

226

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:224

enue Service itself ruled that the spendthrift provisions of ERISA
were not violated by court orders assigning benefits for participants in pay status." Not surprisingly, plan trustees became increasingly embroiled in litigation when they sought to clarify
12
state court orders awarding benefits to the divorced spouse.
The REA resolved these conflicts by amending ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide certainty and consistency for state domestic relations orders. This certainty and
consistency was provided in a number of ways. First, a limited
exception to the ERISA prohibition against assignment or alienation of qualified plan benefits was authorized if a state court order met the requirements of the newly defined QDRO. Second,
new rules were promulgated to facilitate distribution of plan benefits to the divorced spouse. Third, plan administrators were insulated against breach of fiduciary responsibility if they complied
with a court order satisfying the new QDRO requirements.
III.

QDRO

REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

The REA permits assignment and alienation of qualified
plan benefits if the judicial order requiring division of plan benefits satisfies the statutory requirements of the newly defined
QDRO. A QDRO is defined by the Internal Revenue Code as
"any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) which . . . is made pursuant to a
State['s] domestic relations law [in satisfaction of family support
obligations].'
As a matter of mechanics, the order itself must
specify certain facts such as:
(A) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of
the participant and the name and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order,
(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to
be paid by the plan to each such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined,
" See Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85. For an analysis of the Internal Revenue
Service's position on distributing pension benefits not yet in pay status before enactment of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, see Massler, DistributingPension Benefits Not Yet in Pay Status, FAIRSHARE, June 1985, at 6 (proposed distributions for
participants not yet in pay status authorized for division of pension benefits and
transfer of participant's interest from Keogh plan to IRA).
12 See, e.g., Lodge v. Shell Oil Co., 747 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1984) (plan trustees
acted properly in refusing to pay benefits to participants until ex-spouse's ownership rights resolved).
13 I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
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(C) the number of payments or period to which such order
applies, and
(D) each plan to which such order applies.' 4
Substantial compliance with these mechanical requirements may
suffice. 15
The REA defines the permissive distributee under the QDRO
as the alternate payee. The alternate payee may be either the divorced spouse, a previously divorced spouse, a child or other dependent recognized by the local court as entitled to receive all or a
percentage under the plan benefits.' 6
The QDRO may require the plan to pay the divorced spouse
any type or form of benefit offered by the plan regardless of that
chosen by the participant spouse.' 7 For example, the QDRO may
require that the divorced spouse receive an annuity, a lump sum
payment or a percentage of the participant's pension as paid, re18
gardless of the distribution option selected by the participant.
However, the REA does posit several limitations. First, a QDRO
Id. § 414(p)(2).
15 See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 20, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2566. The report states that an order will not lose qualified status
merely because it does not specify the current mailing address of the participant or
alternate payee if the plan administrator has reason to know of their address independent of the order. Id. For example, if the plan administrator is aware that the
alternate payee is also a participant under the plan and the plan records include a
current address for each participant, the plan administrator may not treat the order
as failing to qualify. Id.
16 See I.R.C. § 414(p)(8) (Supp. IV 1986).
17 See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2566. Before adoption of the REA, plan administrators were reluctant to make requested distribution modes available, in particular lump sum distributions, because of the nation's uncertain long-term economic prospects. See
Massler, The Hazards of Planning on Lump Sum Distributions,FAIRSHARE, Nov. 1984, at
4. In response, judicial sanction was invoked prior to the adoption of the REA for
the following reasons: to secure an award of benefits payable in a form which was
not an optional form of payment (e.g., lump sum where the plan provided only for
an annuity); to secure benefit payments immediately where the plan provided that
benefits would be paid only upon a participant's retirement or termination of employment; and to force the participant spouse to exercise certain plan options in
favor of the divorced spouse. See, e.g., McDermott v. McDermott, 123 Misc.2d 355,
474 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (court designated which retirement option divorcing husband could choose). Cf In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983)
(husband directed to pay wife $10,000 from retirement account at $50 per week).
14

18 See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEws at 2569. Divisibility of plan benefits most often applies where the
economic circumstances of the client do not permit a trade-off against other marital
assets. See e.g., Moore v. Moore, No. A-67 (N.J. Feb. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, State Library, NJ file). In Moore, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the future postretirement cost-of-living increases were subject to equitable distribution. Id. It has
been recommended that marital pension benefits be immediately distributed unless
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may not require the payment of benefits in a form not otherwise
provided in the plan."9 Second, the QDRO may not authorize a
joint and survivor annuity for the divorced spouse and his or her
subsequent spouse.20 Third, the QDRO may "not require the plan
2
to provide increased benefits . . . on the basis of actuarial value." '
employee-spouse is financially burdened by lump sum payment of present value of
benefits. Id.
19 See I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). Treasury regulations protect the
divorced spouse and participant from discriminatory treatment by the plan administrator. All optional forms of benefits are protected, including but not limited to
the timing, payment schedule, medium of benefit distribution, and election rights.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q & A-2(b) (1988) (protected benefits that may be
eliminated or reduced only with IRS consent). Accordingly, the plan administrator
may not eliminate or reduce a form of benefit payment which discriminates in favor
of the prohibited group. See, e.g., id. § 1.401(a)-4 Q& A-I (plan may not condition
availability of single lump sum payment so as to favor prohibited group even if all
benefit options are of equivalent actuarial value); id. § 1.401 (a)-4, Q& A-2 (availability of single sum benefit is discriminatory if limited to employees in corporate
headquarters). The prohibition against discrimination includes actions of plan administrators, fiduciaries, trustees, actuaries and other persons. See id. § 1.411 (d)-4,
Q & A-5. In addition, a qualified plan may not be amended to add employer consent or a discretion provision or any other condition which limits the availability of
an existing alternative form of benefit with respect to benefits already accrued. Id.
§ 1.411 (d)-4(b). The conditioning of availability of an alternate benefit form based
upon objective criteria expressly set forth in the plan is permitted so long as the
criteria do not work in a discriminatory manner. Id. § 1.41 l(d)-4, Q& A-6. Exemplitive permissible discretionary criteria include the insurability of the employee or
the existence of extreme financial need. See id. However, any such exercise of discretion must be reasonably and consistently applied with objective and clearly ascertainable criteria. Employers with "existing plans" generally must comply with
these regulations starting with the 1989 plan year. Id. §§ 1.401 (a), Q & A-6(c)(2)
(1986), 1.411(d)-4, Q& A-9 (1988). Existing plans for purposes of both of these
sections are those adopted and in effect prior to August 1, 1986.
In addition to regulatory protection, a plan may not by amendment eliminate
an optional form of benefit if the QDRO provides otherwise. See S. REP. No. 313,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1105. The alternate payee remains entitled to receive the
benefits in the form specified in the order unless he or she elects to receive the
payment of benefits in another form. Id. In the event a change of law makes the
benefit form specified in the QDRO impermissible, the plan must allow the alternate payee to select any other form of benefit provided in the plan. Id. However,
the spouse's choice of benefit may not affect the benefit chosen by the participant.
See id.
20 See I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)13(g) (4) (iii) (B) (1988).
21 I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4)(iii)
(1988). An order does not provide increased benefits if it does not require the
alternate payee to be paid more than the participant would have been entitled to
receive in the absence of the QDRO. S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 20, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2566. Although a plan need not provide increased benefits on the basis of actuarial value, I.R.C. § 411 (d)(6) (Supp. IV
1986) prohibits plan amendments which reduce accrued benefits. An example of
such a prohibited amendment is the elimination of lump sum distributions for participants or beneficiaries with substandard mortality expectancies even if a benefit
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Fourth, the QDRO may not provide for the payment of benefits already awarded another alternate payee under a prior QDRO.2 2
A.

Governmental Plans

The QDRO provisions only apply to plans which are subject
to the assignment and alienation restrictions of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. 23 Most state and federal plans are exempt from the QDRO rules.2 4 Fortunately, many governmental
plans authorize state domestic relations courts to divide pension
benefits. These plans include military retirement benefits, 2 5 railroad retirement benefits,2 6 and civil service benefits.2 7 Other
governmental plans must be analyzed according to their own individual terms and provisions.
B.

Individual Retirement Accounts

Internal Revenue Code section 408(d)(6) provides that the
transfer of an individual's interest in an individual retirement account (IRA) or an individual retirement annuity to a former
of equal actuarial value based on standard mortality tables is available. S. REP. No.
575 supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS at 2577.
However, elimination of an optional form of benefit may be balanced against other
plan requirements which include the solvency of the trust fund. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 655, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) 2-3 (increased costs to plans from the
REA and its impact on the solvency of trust funds). See generally Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-4, Q & A-2 (1988) (guidelines to determine whether optional form of
benefit satisfies nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)).
For employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), the plan sponsor may eliminate
or retain the discretion to eliminate lump sum distributions or installment payout
options with respect to a nondiscriminatory class of employees. See I.R.C.
§ 411 (d)(6)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). This discretion will not violate the reduction of
accrued benefit requirement under I.R.C. § 41 l(d)(6). With regard to other qualified plans, sponsor amendments will not be deemed to discriminate if based on age
or service conditions. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-4, Q& A-5 (1988) (acceptable alternatives for amendments without violating I.R.C. § 41 1(d)(6)).
22 See I.R.C. § 414(p)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4)
(1988).
23 See I.R.C. § 414(p)(9) (Supp. IV 1986).
24 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. IV 1986). For example, the
Social Security Act preempts local law vitiating state court authority to divide social
security benefits. Id. Indeed, the Social Security Act contains special provisions
dealing with the rights of divorced spouses to obtain old age, disability, survivor
and parents' benefits. Id.
25 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1447, 1448, 1450 (Supp. IV 1986), vacating McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (federal statute precludes state court division of military pension)).
26 See 45 U.S.C. § 231(n) (Supp. IV 1986), vacating Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572 (1979).
27 See 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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spouse under a divorce decree or written instrument incident to
a divorce is not a taxable transfer. After transfer, the account or
annuity is to be treated as maintained for the benefit of the transferee spouse.
The QDRO rules do not necessarily apply to Individual Retirement Account (IRA) transfers incident to divorce. The
QDRO mechanical requirements, however, should be followed
to avoid potential application of the ten percent early distribution tax under Internal Revenue Code section 72(t) for distributions before age fifty-nine and one-half.28 Care must be taken to
avoid transfers other than to former spouses. Otherwise, taxable
29
gain to the transferror may result.

IV.
A.

NEW RULES FOR EARLY PAYOUTS

Payouts Before ParticipantRetirement

REA makes a radical departure from prior law by permitting
benefits to be paid to the divorced spouse on or after the date
that the participant spouse attains or would have attained the earliest retirement age. 30 "Earliest retirement age," a term of art,
generally means early retirement age under the plan (often fiftyfive). 3 ' The Conference Report to the Tax Reform Act of 1986

provides that distributions under a QDRO may be made without
regard to the participant's age if the plan so permits,32 thereby
authorizing benefits to be paid prior to the participant attaining
earliest retirement age. 3 However, benefit payments before the
earliest retirement age must be with the consent of the plan administrator in addition to being authorized by the plan's
28 See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1986). Distributions are also permitted to
be made to an employee after separation from service on account of early retirement after attainment of age 55. Id. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v).
29 See Priv. Ltr. Rul.

88-20-086

(Feb. 25,

1988)

(announcing that I.R.C.

§ 408(d)(6), and not I.R.C. § 1041, governs IRA transfers incident to divorce);
Rooney, Beware the Double Traps in Divorce Transfers of IRA's, FAIRSHARE, Dec. 1987, at

8.

30 I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Earliest retirement age by statutory
definition means the earlier of (1) the earliest date benefits are payable under the
plan, or (2) "the later of the date the participant attains age 50 or the earliest date
on which the participant could begin receiving benefits under the plan" if he or she
separated from service. Id. Only actual years of service are to be taken into account when interpreting plan provisions. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1097.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-17(b) (1988).
32 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. II at 858 (1986).

33 Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(3) (1988) (waiver of distribution
requirements).
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provisions.
In the event that a divorced spouse wishes to begin receiving
pension payments when the participant spouse reaches early retirement age, his or her choice will have an economic cost inasmuch as benefit reductions are mandated. First, the recipient
spouse will receive only the actuarial equivalent of the participant's normal retirement benefits.35 Employer early retirement
subsidies (if applicable) may not be included in the benefits paid
under the QDRO. 3 6 However, if the participant subsequently retires and receives an early retirement subsidy, the amount payable to the divorced spouse will be recalculated so that he or she
shares in this subsidy.37 Second, actuarial cut-backs are required
for benefits paid upon early retirement 38 and "[t]he amount payable under a QDRO following the participant's earliest retirement age cannot exceed the amount which the participant [would
39
have been] entitled to receive at such time."

B.

Cashouts of $3,500

Often an employee will work for a company for a short period of time, earn benefits of a de minimis amount, and then leave
34 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 32, at 858.
35 I.R.C. § 414(p)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). The interest rate to be assumed in

determining present values is the interest rate specified by the plan. Id. If the plan
fails to specify a rate, a 5% rate is to be used. Id. § 414(p)(4)(A).
36 Id. § 414(p)(4)(A)(ii). Early retirement subsidies include retirement-type subsidies, not disability, medical, death (including life insurance), or plant shut-down
benefits. They are protected benefits under I.R.C. section 411 (d)(6), and may not
be reduced, eliminated or made subject to employer discretion if accrued except to
the extent otherwise permitted by regulation. Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (d)-4, Q, & A- 1
(1988).
37 S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 21, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2567.
38 See I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1986) (benefit reductions mandated for
payments beginning before social security retirement age). The 1986 amendments
slashed the limits on amounts paid upon early retirement (i) commencing at age 62
from $90,000 to $72,000 and (ii) commencing at age 55 from $75,000 to $40,000.
In addition, the $90,000 benefit limit under I.R.C. § 415 is to be ratably reduced
for participants with fewer than ten years of plan participation. Id. § 415(b)(5).
Because employees do not receive a defined benefit upon payout, target benefit
plans may be used to avoid the benefit limits under I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C). Indeed,
with early retirement, they merely receive the vested dollar amounts allocated to
their account.
39 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 32, at 858. For example, if a profitsharing plan authorized a participant to withdraw part of his or her account balance
prior to separation from service, the QDRO could provide for payment of benefits
to the alternate payee up to the partial amount which the participant was authorized
to withdraw under the plan's provisions. Id.
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his or her job for another position. To assist plans to reduce
their administrative overhead from accounting for these insignificant amounts, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased from
$1,750 to $3,500 the amount of accrued benefits which plans are
40
permitted to distribute to participants without their consent.
Plans accomplish this distribution invariably by making payment
in a lump sum. However, forced distributions of an employee's
nonforfeitable benefits are permitted only if the payment is disbursed due 4 to the termination of the employee's plan
participation. 1
If the present value of the participant's benefit exceeds
$3,500, the plan can distribute the benefit only with the written
consent of the spouse and program participant. 42 If the present
value of the accrued benefit is less than $3,500, the plan 43can
If
force distribution if made before the annuity starting date.
the distribution is contemplated to be made after the annuity
starting date, both the participant and spouse must consent in
writing even if the value is less than $3,500. 4 4 Calculation of the
$3,500 threshold is subject to highly technical rules4 5 although it
must include both employer and non-deductible employee
contributions 46
See I.R.C. § 417(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
Id. § 411(a)(7)(B).
Id. § 417(e)(2).
Id. § 417(e)(1). "Annuity starting date," like other terms of art used by the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, is specially defined in the statutory scheme. The
REA had provided that the annuity starting date was "the first day of the first period for which an amount was received whether by reason of retirement or disability." I.R.C. § 417(0(2) (1984) amended by I.R.C. § 417(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
Annuity starting date is clarified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to mean (i) in the
case of benefits payable as an annuity, "the first day of the first period for which an
amount is payable as an annuity" regardless of when or whether payment is made,
and for all other situations (ii) the date "on which all events have occurred which
entitle the participant to such benefit" whether due to separation from service or
applicable consent to payment. Id. § 417(f)(2)(A). Annuity starting date also includes the date of commencement of disability benefits if not auxiliary. Id.
§ 417(0(2)(B). Auxiliary means that the early receipt of the disability payments
reduce pension benefits when subsequently paid. If payments are to be made retroactively to an earlier starting period, the earlier starting period is the annuity
starting date. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q & A-10(b) (1988). If payments are
postponed from an earlier date, the earlier date remains the starting date. Id.
44 I.R.C. § 417(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
45 See id. § 417(e)(3) (determination of present value, Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)1(d) (interest rate requirements and formula). See also S. REP. No. 313, supra note
19, at 1097-98 (interest assumptions for voluntary cashouts). Present value is conformed to Rev. Rul. 79-90, 1979-1 C.B. 155.
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-l(a)(3) (1988). Nonvested portions of accrued benefits are disregarded for purposes of ascertaining the $3,500 threshold. S. REP. No.
40
41
42
43
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SURVIVOR BENEFITS AND SPOUSAL CONSENTS

Prior law had provided that unless a participant elected
otherwise, a pension plan had to automatically provide a qualified joint and survivor annuity if the plan's normal form of benefit was a life annuity or the participant elected a life annuity and
was married for the one-year period ending on the date that payments commenced.4 7 The employee still in pay status who was
eligible for early retirement was entitled to elect a pre-retirement
survivor annuity for his or her spouse. However, the failure of
many participants to do so resulted in loss of pension benefits for
the surviving spouse.48
The Retirement Equity Act contains a novel provision requiring that a pension plan provide automatic survivor benefits
to protect the wives of vested participants who died while in pay
status, but having failed to elect spousal survivor benefits. Unless
waived, automatic survivor benefits are mandated both before
and after retirement for married participants. 49 For a participant
who retires under a plan, a qualified joint and survivor annuity is
mandated.5 For vested participants who die before retirement,
313, supra note 19, at 1109. Query whether an employee could force his or her
former employer to retain the account balance by making nondeductible contributions to the plan assuming voluntary contributions were permitted under the plan's
provisions? Such a result would frustrate the purpose underpinning forced cashouts of small benefit amounts.
47 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1 1) (1982) amended by I.R.C. § 401(a)(l 1) (Supp. IV 1986).
Regulations under this section were interpreted prior to the REA to mean that a
plan offering a life annuity as a benefit option had to provide that the automatic
form of benefit payment was a qualified joint and survivor annuity. This interpretation was rejected in BBS Assocs. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1118 (1980), aff'd mem.,
661 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1981). These pre-REA regulations were amended in 1988 to
conform to the BBS decision and now provide that life annuity benefits must be
paid in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity unless the participant
elects otherwise. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-I l(a)(1)(ii) (1988).
48 See, e.g., Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383 (7th
Cir. 1986) (court upheld plan administrator's refusal to pay benefits where participant divorced before enactment of REA and failed to elect survivor benefits or
name child as beneficiary). Attempts by a participant's survivors to collect on the
equitable grounds of unjust enrichment have been rebuffed. Id.
49 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(l 1), 417(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Special spousal consents
are required if a couple wishes to waive survivor benefits or revoke elections already in place. Id. § 417(a)(1),(2). Written explanations by the plan of these rights
is mandated. Id. § 417(a)(3)(A).
50 See id. § 401(a)(l 1)(A)(i). A "qualified joint and survivor annuity" is defined
as "an annuity (1) for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for the life of
the spouse which is not less than 50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent
of) the amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant and the spouse, and (2) which is the actuarial equivalent of a single annuity for
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spousal survivor annuity protection is also required. 5 '

These

provisions apply to all pension plans. However, profit sharing
plans or stock bonus plans are exempted if they meet special requirements which, in effect, provide survivor benefits as a matter
of plan construction without the participant's affirmative
election.52
If a participant dies after separation from service or attainment of normal retirement age, but prior to the annuity starting
date, the survivor benefit to be paid is the qualified preretirement
survivor benefit, rather than the survivor benefit portion of the
qualified joint and survivor annuity. 5 3 In the case of a participant

who separates from service prior to death, the amount of the
qualified preretirement survivor annuity is to be calculated by
reference to the actual date of separation from service rather
than the date of death.54
Not surprisingly, preretirement survivor benefits may not be
less than the payments would have been under a qualified joint
and survivor annuity.55 Preretirement survivor benefits for profit
sharing plans that are subject to the survivor annuity provisions
must be the actuarial equivalent of at least fifty percent of the
account balance to the participant's credit on the date of death.56
the life of the participant." Id. § 417(b). This term of art also includes any annuity
having the effect of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. Id.
51 Id. § 401(a)(l l)(A)(ii). A "qualified preretirement survivor annuity" is defined under I.R.C. § 417(c) as the actuarial equivalent of the amount of the survivor
annuity under the qualified joint and survivor annuity. For profit sharing plans,
survivor benefits must be "the actuarial equivalent of which is not less than 50 percent of the portion of the account balance of the participant (as of the date of
death) .... Id. § 417(c)(2).
52 See id. § 401(a) (11) (B) (iii). This section provides that the requirements of
joint and survivor annuities and preretirement survivor annuities apply to any defined contribution plan which is subject to the minimum funding requirements of
I.R.C. § 412 or any other defined contribution plan unless (i) the plan automatically
provides that the participant's vested accrued benefit "is payable in full, on the
death of the participant, to the participant's surviving spouse" or designated beneficiary to whom the spouse consents, (ii) no life annuity has been elected by the
participant, and (iii) the "plan is not a direct or indirect transferee" of a defined
benefit plan or a defined contribution plan subject to the minimum funding standards of I.R.C. § 412. Id.
The determination of whether a plan is a "transferee plan" under I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(1 l)(B)(iii) is addressed in the regulations under I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(1 1) and
417. The intent of the transferee rule is to preclude a participant from being able
to avoid the survivor annuity rules by transferring defined plan benefits to an exempt profit sharing plan.
53 S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1093-94.
54 Id. at 1096.
55 I.R.C. § 417(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
56 Id. § 417(c)(2).
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Because plans may either (i) provide benefit options which
are more favorable than a joint and survivor annuity or (ii) reduce benefits by the cost of providing survivor protection, the
REA permits waiver of the survivor benefit provisions.5 7 For the
waiver of survivor benefits to be legally effective, special spousal
election and notice procedures are mandated by which the
spouse must consent in writing (before the plan representative or
notary public) to any waiver of survivor benefits or to revoke
elections already in place. 58 These spousal election and notice
procedures are underpinned by written explanation requirements imposed on the plan before payments commence. Such
explanation should include the terms of the qualified joint and
survivor
annuity and the legal effect of a waiver of survivor benefits. 59 For fully subsidized plans which do not decrease benefits
or increase costs to a participant if survivor protection
is chosen,
60
notice of the right to waive is not required.
57 See id. § 417(a)(1),(2) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-21
(1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-I 1(e) (1988) (plan may take into account in any equitable manner increased costs resulting from survivor benefits; plan may give participant option of paying premiums if corollary option under which premiums are
not required is provided).
In addition to economic considerations, the Internal Revenue Service had
taken the position that with the 1986 repeal of I.R.C. § 2517, a participant who
elected a joint and survivor annuity incurred gift tax liability. See Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,159 (Feb. 24, 1983); Wilkie, The Repeal of Section 2517: Death Knell for Survivor Annuities?, I Pens. & Profit Sharing (P-H) 1115 (1988). However, the Internal
Revenue Service position was overturned in the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6152, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (102 Stat.) 3725 (survivor annuity election qualified for a qualified terminable
interest property (QTIP) marital deduction). See Taylor,Jointand Survivor Annuities:
Recent Developments, 30 Tax. Mgmt. (BNA) 3 (1988).
58 See I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
59 Id. § 417(a)(3)(A). Comparable written explanations are also mandated for
preretirement survivor annuities.
60 Id. § 417(a)(5). This notice requirement only applies if the plan does not permit the participant to waive the fully subsidized benefit or to designate another as
beneficiary. Id. The 1986 amendments clarify that a benefit will not be considered
fully subsidized even if the cost of the survivor benefit is spread among all plan
participants or among a subgroup of participants. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at
1102.
A fully subsidized benefit is one under which no increase in cost or decrease in
benefit to the participant results from the participant's failure to elect another benefit mode. I.R.C. § 417(a)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). For example, if a pension plan
offers both a joint and survivor annuity and a lump sum distribution, the plan
would not be deemed to fully subsidize the joint and survivor annuity even if its
actuarial value were greater than the lump sum. This is because the participant's
benefit in the event of early death would- obviously be less than the benefit received
as a lump sum. By comparison, a profit sharing plan would be deemed to provide
fully subsidized benefits if the account balances were not reduced by qualified prer-
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The Retirement Equity Act mandates that spousal consent
be given in writing at the time of the participant's election. Special election period and notice requirements are provided in the
statutory scheme. 6 However, a waiver of survivor benefits by the
participant's spouse will not bind a subsequent spouse of the
same participant.6 2 Further, spousal consent rules do not apply
to antenuptial agreements or similar contracts entered into prior
to marriage.63
The survivor benefit rules only apply to vested benefits.
Such rules, however, are not applied to benefits that become
vested because of death or to life insurance contract proceeds. 64
The survivor benefit rules do apply to insurance proceeds of
profit sharing plans if they are subject to the survivor benefit
etirement survivor coverage. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-38 (1988) (explanation and examples of fully subsidized benefits).
61 I.R.C. § 417(a)(3),(6) (Supp IV 1986). A married participant who retires may
elect, without the consent of his or her spouse, to begin receiving a qualified joint
and survivor annuity before attaining the latter of age 62 or normal retirement age.
Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-l(b) (1988).
The regulations under I.R.C. § 401(a) (1 1) (Supp. IV 1986) specify various requirements for spousal consent. The more important requirements provide that (i)
spousal consent is binding only upon the consenting spouse, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.40 1(a)-20, Q & A-29 (1988), and (ii) a plan has the option to make spousal
consent irrevocable. Id. § 1.401 (a)-20, Q & A-30. If the participant and spouse
elect not to receive a joint and survivor annuity, the spousal waiver election period
is the 90-day period before the commencement of benefits. See id. § 1.401(a)-(20),
Q & A-3 1. If the commencement of benefits may be delayed, the 90-day period
does not start until the 90 days before the benefits start. Id. § 1.401(a)-I l(c)(ii).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 enhanced the REA spousal consent requirement to
include spousal consent for a change in benefit form. I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)(ii) (Supp.
IV 1986). In addition, the 1986 legislation clarified that spousal consent to waive
survivor benefits is not valid unless it (i) names a designated beneficiary who would
receive survivor benefits under the plan or (ii) acknowledges that the spouse had
the right to limit consent only to a named beneficiary. Id. The judiciary has
broadly interpreted the legislative history and applied, the spousal consent rules
retroactively. See Art Builders Profit Sharing Plan v. Bosely, 649 F. Supp. 848 (D.
Md. 1986).
The spousal consent form must contain such information as is appropriate to
inform the spouse of the rights he or she is relinquishing so that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1098. If the consent
designates a beneficiary, subsequent change of beneficiary will not be valid unless
the participant's spouse submits a new consent form. Id. If a plan permits a general consent, the acknowledgment on the general consent must indicate that the
spouse is aware that a more limited consent could be given. Id. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401 (a)-20, Q & A-31 (1988) (rules governing waiver of survivor benefits under
I.R.C. § 417(a)(2)).
62 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-29 (1988).
63 Id. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-28.
64 Id. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-12.
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requirements .65

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 expanded survivor benefit
rules in two significant areas. First, for purposes of determining
who is a vested participant, accrued benefits include amounts derived from employee contributions. 66 Second, spousal consent is
made a condition precedent to a participant's ability to pledge
accrued benefits as security for a loan.67 Spousal identity is to be
determined as of the date that the loan is made. Accordingly, if
the participant defaults on the loan after remarriage, the second
spouse's rights will be vitiated by the prior spouse's consent.68
Spousal consent to loans is made in the same manner as waiver of
survivor benefits.69
It is important to emphasize that the new rules requiring
spousal consent to loans apply only if consent is mandated by
statute. Profit sharing or stock bonus plans which are not subject
to the survivor benefit rules will not require spousal consent
before the loan is made.
One-Year Rule
The one-year rule developed under Treasury regulations
which interpreted the joint and survivor annuity requirement to
apply only if the spouse was married to the participant for at least
the one-year period prior to the date of his or her death. 70 The
one-year rule developed to provide plans with some measure of
protection against expensive "death bed" marriages whereby a
terminally ill participant married and retired immediately on a
joint and survivor benefit. 7 '
Although many plan sponsors offered joint and survivor annuities to married employees regardless of the length of marriage, the REA modified the one-year rule in accordance with its
A.

65 See id.
66 I.R.C.

§§ 417(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); I.R.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-I1 (1988). See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1100.
67 I.R.C. § 417(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
68 S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1099.
69 I.R.C. § 417(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-24
(1988). Spousal consent to loans must be made in writing and witnessed before the
plan administrator or notary public. Id. The election period is the 90-day period
before the execution of the security agreement. I.R.C. § 417(a)(4)(A). Special
rules apply in the case of a participant residing outside of the United States. See S.
REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1100.
70 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-I l(d)(3) (1988).
71 See id. § 1.401(a)-I l(d)(3)(iv). The burden of providing the required notice of
the marriage to the plan administrator continues to remain that of the participant.
Id.
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general purpose of providing survivor benefit protection to widows and widowers. Accordingly, survivor benefits must be provided automatically if "the participant and spouse [have] been
married throughout the 1-year period ending on the earlier of
(A) the participant's annuity starting date, or (B) the date of the
participant's death."'7 2 A special rule provides that if a participant marries within the one-year period before the annuity starting date and dies after having been married at least one year, he
or she is deemed to have "been married throughout the 1-year
period ending on the participant's annuity starting date."7 3
However, this special rule only applies if the participant is married before the annuity payments start.7 " If a plan is exempt from
the survivor benefit requirement, it is not required to pay the
participant's vested benefits upon death to his or her surviving
were married for at
spouse unless the participant and spouse
75
death.
of
date
the
of
as
year
one
least
72 I.R.C. § 417(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). "[A] plan that is exempt from the survivor benefit [rules] may provide for the payment of the participant's nonforfeitable
accrued benefit (without the consent of the participant's surviving spouse) to a beneficiary other than the participant's spouse if the participant and spouse have been
married for less than 1 year as of the [date of] death of the participant." S. REP.
No. 313, supra note 19, at 1096-97. Likewise, a plan that is subject to the survivor
benefit requirements may also provide that a joint and survivor annuity or a qualified preretirement survivor annuity will not be paid unless the participant and
spouse have been married throughout the one-year period ending on the earlier of
the participant's annuity starting date or the date of his or her death. See S. REP.
No. 313, supra note 19, at 1096; Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-25 (1988).
73 I.R.C. § 417(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
74 Id. § 417(d)(2)(A). Two examples serve to illustrate this convoluted statutory
scheme. First, consider a participant who will reach age 65 in June, 1988. Starting
off the new year, January 1, 1988, he secures a final decree of divorce and remarries. Starting in June, 1988, at age 65, he retires and starts receiving benefits under
a single life annuity. In June, of 1989, he dies at age 66. Under these circumstances, the plan must provide a survivor annuity for his second wife. Although he
did not elect survivor benefits for his wife, the special rule applies since the participant did marry within the one-year period before the annuity starting date and was
married at least one year as of the date of death.
Second, consider a participant retiring at early retirement age (55 under most
plans). The plan contains a one-year marriage restriction. The participant, single,
elects a single life annuity. He marries nine months later and dies several years
after. Under the one-year rule, the surviving spouse will not receive any survivor
benefits because she was not married to him in the one-year period ending upon
the earlier of the annuity starting date or the date of death. The special one-year
rule does not apply in this second example because the participant was not married
before the annuity payments commenced. See id. § 417(d)(2).
75 Id. § 401(a)(It)(D).
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Drafting Considerations

For clients who divorce and remarry near retirement age, a
QDRO providing that the former spouse is not entitled to survivor benefits becomes critically important to ensure that the second spouse is protected.7 6 Fortunately, ensuring that the
divorced spouse does not receive survivor benefits is subject to a
rule of reason even if the QDRO does not specifically address
this problem. In this regard, the survivor benefit provisions will
not apply "unless they are consistent with the order."'7 7 Accordingly, state law and the express terms and conditions of the divorce decree or separation agreement will govern application of
the survivor benefit provisions.7 8
If the former spouse is treated as a surviving spouse under
the rules, all the election, waiver and consent requirements discussed will apply to the former spouse even if the participant remarries. Inherent in Internal Revenue Code section 414(p) is the
recognition that two spouses may share in survivor benefits-the
divorced spouse under the QDRO and the second spouse on the
date of death. Internal Revenue Code section 414(p)(5)(A) provides that a QDRO may require that the ex-spouse be regarded
as the surviving spouse for survivor benefit purposes. Accordingly, careful planning for survivor benefits in drafting the
QDRO is necessary to ensure that the ex-spouse does or does
not participate. As a precaution, both parties should consult with
the plan administrator to ascertain what elections may already be
in place.
If a divorcee is to receive separate compensation in exchange for the participant retaining all pension benefits, the new
76 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, Q&A-25 (1988); id. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4). If the
participant divorces his spouse prior to the annuity starting date, any elections
made while the participant was married to his or her former spouse remain valid
unless otherwise provided in a QDRO or unless the participant changes them or is
remarried. Id. § 1.401(a)-20, Q& A-25 (1988); id. § 1.401(a)-13(g)(4).
77 S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CONG. CODE &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2569.
78 See, e.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 684 F.
Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (denying divorced spouse plan benefits based on decree
waiver where divorced spouse waived death benefits in divorce decree but where
plan participant had failed to delete her as plan beneficiary). The terms and conditions of the governing divorce decree or separation agreement will control the timing, amount and form of benefits. See Moore v. Moore, No. 86-2530 (D. Kan. May
10, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). In Moore, the parties' separation
agreement provided benefits to the divorced spouse upon the death of the participant. Id. The court suggested that a new QDRO be drafted according to state law
so that distribution could be accelerated. Id.
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spousal consent procedures mandate that he or she waive survivor benefits expressly in the separation agreement as part of the
relinquishment of pension benefits. This express waiver becomes very important with "no fault" divorces wherein the waiting period from separation to final divorce may be as long as
eighteen months. The separation agreement should require that
the divorced spouse waive survivor benefits and sign a joint return prior to the final decree of divorce.79
VI.

TAX

TREATMENT OF DIVORCE DISTRIBUTIONS

Under the rationale of United States v. Davis,80 a participant

spouse may have been subjected to immediate taxation if retirement benefits were awarded to the divorced spouse. Fortunately,
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 rendered tax-free any transfers of
property between spouses during marriage or between former
spouses pursuant to a divorce. 8 '
Under the REA, the divorced spouse is treated as a plan beneficiary for purposes of tax treatment of QDRO distributions with
some modifications.1 2 The general rule for taxation of benefits is
that amounts paid to a spouse or divorced spouse are included in
their gross income.8 3 Payments made to a child or other alternate payee other than the divorced spouse are includable in the
income of the participant spouse only. 4 As under prior law,
amounts actually paid or distributed will be included in gross income in the year received.85
A.

Annuity Payments

If the divorced spouse is to receive payments under the
QDRO in the form of an annuity, Internal Revenue Code section
See 1 ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND COUNSEL FEES AWARD, MODIFICATION &
2.13[3] (H. Massler 1988).
80 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
81 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (Supp. 11 1984) (amended 1986). The Tax Reform Act of
1986 clarifies that transfers in trust trigger gain notwithstanding the nonrecognition rule for dispositions incident to divorce for (i) transfers in trust with liabilities
assumed or taken subject to which exceed the transferror's basis, and (ii) transfers
79

ENFORCEMENT §

in trust of installment obligations. See I.R.C. § 1041(e) (Supp. IV 1986); id.
§ 453B(g). Both amendments relate back to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 for trans-

fers afterJuly 18, 1984.
82 See I.R.C. § 402(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1986). Technically, the ex-spouse (or child of
the alternate payee) is treated as a distributee with respect to payments received
from or under the plan. Id.
83 S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1103-04.
84 S. REP. No: 313, supra note 19, at 1104.

85 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(1),(9) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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72 continues to apply to payments received.86 Under this section, amounts distributed as an annuity are included in the recipient's gross income. To the extent that the participant spouse
made nondeductible after-tax contributions (together with other
amounts treated as an "investment" in the contract), the divorced spouse enjoys equality of treatment under the QDRO
with the participant spouse in that the "investment" is apportioned between the two spouses on a pro rata basis.87 This pro
rata allocation is to be based on the present value of the distributions or payments to the divorced spouse and the present value
of all other benefits payable with respect to the participant
spouse. Legislative regulations specify the method of computing
these benefits.
The general rule for taxation of benefits is followed with regard to this pro rata allocation in that amounts paid to a divorced
spouse are taxed to him or her with amounts retained by the participant spouse taxed to the participant.8 8 Amounts paid to any
person other than the divorced spouse will be taxed to the
participant.89
Under prior law, an exclusion ratio determined the excluded
portion of each annuity payment received representing the employee contribution, unless the investment was recovered within
three years.9" In such event, all of the initial payments representing employee contributions were deemed a return of capital and
received tax-free. All amounts thereafter became includable in
the recipient's income, whether it was the participant spouse or
the ex-spouse pursuant to the QDRO.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated this special threeyear rule, 9 so that a portion of each payment representing both
employer and employee contributions are treated as income, and
a portion treated as a return of the investment. In other words, a
pro rata recovery of the employee's investment contribution is
now required. "If the alternate payee is not a spouse or former
spouse, then the investment in the contract is not allocated to the
86 Id. § 402(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service will compute the taxable portion of a taxpayer's retirement annuity for both United States civil service retirement benefits and private plan accruals. In order to do so, a ruling request must be
submitted accompanied by a $50 fee. See Rev. Proc. 88-8, 1988-4 I.R.B. 22.
87 See I.R.C. § 72(m)(10) (Supp. IV 1986).
88 S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1104.
89 S.REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1104.
90 See I.R.C. § 72(d) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1122(c)(1), 100
Stat. 2085 (1986).

91 Id.
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alternate payee"; rather, "it is recovered by the participant under
'92
the basis recovery rules applicable to the participant.
B.

Taxation of Lump Sum Distributions

A lump sum distribution is defined under the Internal Revenue Code as a distribution, within one taxable year, of the balance to the credit of an employee on account of death, disability,
separation from service, or after the employee has reached age
fifty-nine and one half.93 For the participant spouse, favorable
lump sum distribution tax treatment is preserved for purposes of
94
both capital gains treatment and ten-year income averaging.
For the alternate payee who is either the spouse or former
spouse of the participant, income averaging is available.9 5
C.

Tax-Free Rollovers

The REA provides that the alternate payee may make a taxfree rollover to an individual retirement account or an individual
retirement annuity. 9 6 In the case of an alternate payee who is

neither the spouse nor former spouse of the participant, the code
does not provide for rollovers. Unlike the participant spouse, the
divorced spouse may not make tax-free rollovers to other qualified trusts and annuity plans. If the distribution to the ex-spouse
consists of property other than money, the specific property itself
S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1104.
93 See I.R.C. § 402(e)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
94 See I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(M) (Supp. IV 1986). In line with the repeal of the deduction for long-term capital gains of individuals effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1987, capital gains treatment for distributions from
qualified plans are phased out over six years beginning on January 1, 1987. Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminates ten-year forward averaging for
taxable years beginning in 1987. In place thereof, the 1986 amendments permit a
one-time election of five-year forward averaging for a lump sum distribution received after attainment of age 59-1/2. See I.R.C. § 402(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). Special transition rules are provided under which the capital gains portion
may continue to be taxed at 20%. Id. However, the 20% capital gains rate on a
qualifying lump sum distribution is preserved only for an individual who has attained the age of 50 as of January 1, 1986. Id. Additional special elections are
provided for employees who turn age 50 before January 1, 1986. Pub. L. No. 100647, § 1011A(b), 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 3472. With
some modification, the new rules are effective starting in 1987.
92

95 Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6068, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102

Stat.) 3703. The new I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(O) extends § 402(e) income averaging to
lump sum distributions paid to an alternate payee spouses or former spouses of the
participant. Id. The 1988 amendments are retroactively effective for tax years ending after December 31, 1984. Id.
96 I.R.C. § 402(a)(6)(F) (Supp. IV 1986).
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must be rolled over. Careful attention must be paid to the requirement of Internal Revenue Code section 402(a)(5)(C) that all
rollovers must be made within sixty days of receipt of the
distribution.9 7
D. Premature DistributionPenalties
Amounts received from qualified plans by an individual who
is a five percent (or more) "owner" or key employee under a topheavy plan, before the participant reaches age fifty-nine and onehalf or becomes disabled, are subject to a special ten percent tax
penalty. The REA provides that payments to an ex-spouse under
a QDRO before the participant reaches age fifty-nine and onehalf will not be subject to this monetary sanction. 98
VII.

PLAN ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

Plan administrators are insulated from violations of fiduciary
responsibility to the extent that they comply with the statutory
requirements for QDRO's and payments made pursuant to these
orders.99 A plan will not fail to satisfy qualification requirements
merely because it is not amended to comply with the new QDRO
provisions.100

Internal Revenue Code sections 414(p)(6) and (7) outline
QDRO procedures. The plan administrator, after receipt of any
domestic relations order, is required to:
97 Partial distributions may be rolled over to an IRA or to an Individual Retirement Annuity. Id. § 402(a)(5)(D)(ii). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 sanctions
QDRO partial rollovers and requires that the plan administrator provide notice
when making any distribution eligible for rollover treatment, including partial rollovers. See id. § 402(a)(6)(F),(f)(2); S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1109-10.
98 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1986). The question arises as to whether the
10% excise tax would apply if the alternate payee's former spouse were a key employee and benefits were distributed before the alternate payee reached 59-1/2.
Because the REA rewrote the taxation rules to provide special treatment for the
divorced spouse or child, it is unlikely that these rules would be applied in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation, which is to provide special
rules for determining the tax treatment of benefits paid pursuant to qualified domestic relations orders.
99 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(I) (Supp. IV 1986). State courts have not been
reluctant to award counsel fees against plan administrators. See, e.g., Olivarez v.
Olivarez, 188 Cal. App. 3d 336, 232 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1986) (state court award of
legal fees to spouse enforcing sting support order against pension plan not violative of ERISA). However, compliance with a nonqualified order would result in
ERISA sanctions, fiduciary and plan liability, and adverse tax consequences for employers and employees and the trust fund itself. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132 (Supp. IV 1986).
100 Treas. Reg § 1.401(a)-13(g)(2) (1988).
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(i) promptly notify all interested parties,
(ii) promptly acknowledge to both the participant and the alternate payee of receipt of the order and to provide any procedures which the plan may have for determination of the
qualified status of the domestic relations order, and
(iii) within a reasonable period after receipt of the order determine whether the order meets the QDRO requirements and
to notify the participant and the alternate payee of the
determination.'0 1

Notices required by these procedures are to be forwarded to the
addresses provided in the domestic relations order, or if the QDRO
fails to designate such, to the last known residence of the employee
10 2
or alternate payee.
Pending the determination of whether the QDRO meets statutory requirements, the plan administrator must separately account
for the amounts payable to the alternate payee. 10 3 Interest is to be
paid on these funds when it is finally distributed.'0 4 An eighteenmonth period is established within which to determine whether the
order meets the QDRO requirements. 0 5 The Act contemplates
that this determination may be made either by the plan administrator or by the court with jurisdiction over the marital dissolution. If
within the eighteen-month period it is determined that the order is
not a qualified QDRO, or if for any reason the matter is still being
contested in court, the plan administrator is directed to pay the
amount to the participant or such other designated beneficiary as if
101 I.R.C. § 414(p)(6),( 7 ) (Supp. IV 1986). Under ERISA, plan procedures relating to domestic relations orders must be in writing. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3)(G)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). These procedures must permit the divorcing
spouse to designate a representative to receive copies of notices sent by the plan
administrator. Id. In addition, the secretary of labor is authorized to promulgate
regulations as to what constitutes a "reasonable period." S. REP. No. 575, supra
note 1, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2568.
102 S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2568. A plan may not permit forfeiture of the benefits which
would have been paid to an alternate payee who cannot be located unless the plan
also permits full reinstatement in the event the alternate payee is found. Id.
103 I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 deleted
the prior law requirement that the plan administrator segregate the disputed
amounts in a separate account in the plan or in an escrow account. Pub. L. No. 99514, § 1898(c), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). However, there is no bar against the use of a
segregated asset account or an escrow account for segregated amounts. See S. REP.
No. 313, supra note 19, at 1104. Segregated amounts are amounts that "would
have been payable to the alternate payee during [the determination] period if the
order had been determined to be a qualified domestic relations order." I.R.C.
§ 414(p)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
104 I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
105 Id. § 414(p)(7)(B), (C), (D).
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there were no QDRO in existence. °6 Upon resolution of the dispute, the payments are to be made on a prospective basis only (assuming that the eighteen month period has run).' 0 7 Payments made
after the eighteen month period will not affect any state law cause of
action that the ex-spouse may have to recover from the participant
distribution awards paid to the plan employee.' 0 8 Compliance with
these provisions will insulate the plan administrator from any good
faith payments made after the eighteen month period has run.
The plan administrator must automatically defer payment of
benefits upon notice that a QDRO order is being sought.'0 9 Deferral is also mandated if either party is attempting to rectify an asserted deficiency in a QDRO already submitted." 0 In addition, the
plan administrator may not authorize a loan during the deferral period if the loan to the participant is secured by the disputed plan
benefits. "'
VIII.

EFFECTIVE DATES

The effective date of the REA for QDRO purposes is January
1, 1985.112 However, if a plan administrator is already making
payments'pursuant to a state court order entered before January
1, 1985, the plan administrator may treat the pre-1985 order as a
QDRO and continue to make payments. ' 13 The administrator is
given discretion whether to accept orders entered into before
106

Id. § 414(p)(7)(C).

107 Id. § 414(p)(7)(D).
108 S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 2568.
109 I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(E) (Supp. IV 1986). The 1986 Tax Reform Act clarifies
that the 18 month deferral period begins with the date payments would be required
to be made under the QDRO. Id.
1o See id. § 414(p)(7)(A); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 32. For example,

if a participant in a profit sharing plan requests a lump sum distribution but the
plan administrator receives notice before payment is made that the participant's
spouse is seeking a domestic relations order to have part of the qualified plan benefits paid to her, the plan administrator should delay payment of benefits after receipt of notice that the QDRO is being sought. Id.

It is recommended that a restraining order prohibiting the disposition of a participant's benefits pending resolution of the marital dispute be sought if the participant is entitled to immediate distribution of his or her benefits after the divorce
action has been commenced. See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1105 (plan
administrator to follow restraining orders pending resolution of disputes with respect to QDRO).
Ill S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 1104.

112 Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 303(d), 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified as amended in 29
U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. IV 1986)).
11 See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 1, at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2569.
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January 1, 1985 as QDROs if payments have not yet commenced. 1 4 The REA "encourages plan administrators to treat
an existing order as qualified to the extent it is consistent with
the provisions of the [Act]."1 5 If a plan administrator refuses to
treat a pre-1985 order as a QDRO becaJuse it is inconsistent with
16
the Act, modification of the order is the appropriate remedy."
IX.

DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS

As previously stated, the REA defines domestic relations or-

ders as any state domestic relations court judgment, decree, order or approved property settlement agreement. 1 7 Although
the mechanical requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section
41 4 (p)( 2 ) must be complied with, actual drafting of the order
should-be done pursuant to local law.
114 Id.

115 Id.
116 Id.

117 I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).

